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Political φρόνησις
ABSTRACT: The paper discusses the relation of φρόνησις to excellences of character 
in matters of politics. The so-called civic excellences play a key role in that connection. The 
various kinds of practical insight shed light to the different positions occupied by ordinary 
citizens and rulers in the state. Their difference is established also by the cognitive states 
they are endowed with; excellent rulers have knowledge, whereas excellent ordinary citi-
zens have right opinion. The distinction will be discussed within the context of Aristotle’s 
treatment of knowledge and opinion in An. Post. II.
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near the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics (i 2, 1094a26–28) Aristotle tells us that 
it is the task of political expertise to study the ultimate end of human beings, 
which is happiness, or well-being (εὐδαιμονία). it is the most sovereign, the 
most ‘architectonic’ expertise for it sets out which of the other expertises there 
needs to be in cities, and what sort of expertise people should acquire, and up 
to what point. other expertise such as generalship, household management and 
rhetoric falls under its direction. it makes use of the other practical expertises, 
and legislates about what one should do and what things one must abstain from 
doing. hence its end will comprise the particular ends of the rest. To mention 
but one sample, in a well-governed state, military experts are placed under the 
control of statesmen who have learnt the proper uses to which war should be 
put. There is a priority concerning the end since even if the good is the same 
for the individual and the city, the good of the city is greater and more complete 
thing both to achieve and to preserve. excellences (ἀρεταί), both in character 
and thinking, are necessary for a happy life, which is the final good, and for this 
reason it is a small surprise that they have manifestations in civic life.
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As the intellectual virtue concerned with practical matters, φρόνησις, practi-
cal insight, is central for the unity of excellences of character.1 it is not possible 
to possess excellence in the primary sense without practical insight, nor is it pos-
sible to have practical insight without excellence of character (ne 1144b32–3). 
its role is linked to the problem of how to follow the rules in the city. The just 
person is not a automatic follower of rules. it is fairly easy to follow the rules of a 
given community, and practically any adult can perform it without much think-
ing. People believe that to have recognised what is just and what is unjust in-
volves no special accomplishment; they assume that it is not hard to understand 
the issues the laws address (ne 1137a10 ff.). To show it, he takes the example of 
medicine. in general, we all know what makes for health; it is a matter of honey, 
wine, hellebore, cautery and surgery. But we have to be a doctor to know how to 
administer them with a view to producing health, and to whom, and when. To 
have excellences of character in full we need φρόνησις and vice versa, to have 
φρόνησις we need excellences of character (ne 1144b32). The excellence of 
lawfulness is not just a matter of being law-abiding. As Aristotle puts it, due to 
his intellectualistic position socrates might have thought that the excellences 
were prescriptions, although we can only say that they are accompanied with 
prescriptions. Practical insight is one, and if it is present, all the excellences will 
be present with it. it has a certain kind of generality since if every excellence 
of character had a kind of practical insight of its own, we would not be capable 
of deciding what to do in each situations. concrete situations may call for the 
exercise of several excellences of character, but it is one decision that has to 
be made. furthermore, if practical insight is a stable state of the soul, like all 
the excellences of character (ne 1105a33), it has to have all the excellences of 
character since the lack of a single one would weaken its performance.2 conse-
quently, strictly speaking excellences of character imply one another indirectly 
because each requires practical insight, which connects them. The uniting fac-
tor is φρόνησις.3 excellences of character do not involve one another in the way 
we read it in Plato’s Protagoras. There is no logical dependency between these 
excellences because unity is provided by an external factor, the practical insight 
which is an intellectual virtue. here we can also see that as an intellectual vir-
tue φρόνησις connects the two definitions of human being. As an intellectual 
virtue it provides the ground for the definition according to which humans are 
rational animals, and as a virtue guaranteeing the unity of virtues it justifies the 
1  for an overview of the scholarly discussion of the topic, with a particular emphasis on 
political issues, see Bodéüs (1993. 27–30).
2  see Broadie-rowe (2002. 383).
3  it is important to have in mind, as has been shown by engberg-Pedersen (1983. 56 with 
reference also to Politics 1253a7–18), that as a uniting factor φρόνησις plays a crucial role in 
connecting the “altruistic” reasoning and the so-called prudential reasoning which concerns 
the agent and his personal long-term good.
26 The PoliTics of ArisToTle 
definition that humans are political animals. on this account practical insight is 
the virtue which enables us to recognise what is good and useful for us.4 There 
are two questions to be raised. What is the role of practical insight in action 
and how to understand the relation between practical insight and excellences of 
character in politics?
As for the first, i do not argue for a thesis of my own. for present purposes, 
i simply accept –because i find it persuasive – the claim that the role of practi-
cal insight is not only to find the most appropriate means to reach the goal set 
by emotional dispositions. its main constituents, deliberation (βούλευσις) and 
decision (προαίρεσις), are not just about finding the best means towards certain 
goals. rather, they concern goals and means alike. Although the final goal, hap-
piness or well-being, is not something to be deliberated since it is encoded in us 
– we have a certain natural drive towards it – the particular goals can be subject 
to deliberation and thus fall within the authority of practical insight.5
The question to be settled now is whether the scheme we have found in 
Nicomachean Ethics Book 6 applies to politics as well. To see it, first i shall dis-
cuss the so-called civic excellences (πολιτικὴ ἀρετή), which might modify the 
scheme we have learnt in the ethics, and then i suggest a possible way of relat-
ing them to practical insight. The second point involves some general claim 
about the role of practical insight in politics. Among others, one has to clarify the 
difference between the practical insight of the ruler and the practical insight of 
the ordinary citizen.
excellence has a formative role in the life of a city. Aristotle insists in Politics 
that rulers must have complete excellence in character (1260b17–18). later on 
(1277a14–15) he adds that the good ruler has not only a fine character but also 
practical insight. As a matter of fact, φρόνησις is the only excellence peculiar to 
the ruler (1277b25–26).6 At least, the ruler must possess it in the full sense. in 
Books 3 and 8 Aristotle claims that civic excellence must be taken into account 
by those who respect the laws (1280b5–6). however, the law does not make us 
good and lover of justice; it is nothing but a certain contract.7 excellence must 
4  see Kamp (1985. 86–87).
5  see, e.g., Wiggins (19983) and ebert (1995). The former also emphasises (235–236) that 
the decisive property of the man of practical insight is the ability to select those features that 
are related to the notion of living well – whose accomplishment is his constant aim – from 
an infinite number of features of a situation. The latter draws attention to the problem of 
interpreting practical insight as a moral notion. With reference to ne 1141a27–28, he stresses 
that Aristotle considered certain non-rational animals as possessing practical insight, but that 
hardly means that they are considered as capable of acting morally. 
6  it follows that the good citizen who is not a ruler cannot possess excellence in character in 
the full sense, the point has been developed in Kraut (2002. 370–71). however, that does not 
mean that the excellences of the rulers could be opposed to the excellences of the subjects, 
see 1277b18–20 and Kamp (1985. 204–205).
7  συνθήκη (1280b10). Aristotle refers to lycophron the sophist as someone thinking that 
laws are a result of contract. he criticises lycophron’s theory by saying that laws conceived of 
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be cared for in a city worthy of its name. if it were not the case, the city would 
only be a community for reaching certain goals by fight (συμμαχία). it would 
be nothing but an ad hoc gathering. furthermore, there would be no difference 
between this city and a loose alliance of settlements located far away from one 
another. nature endows us with the latent capacity for civic excellence and an 
impulse to live in a community (1253a29–30).8 it does not mean that civic excel-
lences are of the same kind. different citizens have different capacities, just as 
sailors differ in capacity since one is a rower, one a pilot, one a lookout. for this 
reason, the most accurate account of the excellence of each citizen will be pecu-
liar to each (1276b20–25).9 it is clear that justice is an important excellence here 
for it qualifies interpersonal relations. The main concern in a true city is that 
citizens should abstain from being unjust to another fellow-citizen (1280b4–5), 
which contributes to unity. due to its interpersonal nature, justice is the most 
important excellence from the point of view of the city. in ideal circumstances, 
equality in excellence matters more than noble birth, and those who excel in 
justice have a greater share in the advantages of the city (1281a7). We might 
expect that just as excellences in general, civic excellences are acquired through 
habituation. on criticising the craft-model of excellences, Aristotle asserts that 
they cannot be taught in the way we learn a craft, as a collection of general rules. 
As he famously claims, excellence is not a matter of rule-following.10 on de-
scribing the acquisition of civic excellence, however, Aristotle offers a modified 
version of the thesis. interestingly enough, a way of acquiring civic excellence 
leads through the learning of rhythm and harmony (1341a1). Music is capable 
as contracts lack the power of making the citizens good and just, see 1280a1–b12. for further 
consequences of the critique, see Bien (1973/1985. 222–223). 
8  see Keyt (1991. 125). he argues that Aristotle’s theory does not imply that humans 
live in political community by nature. instead, political community is an artefact of practical 
insight. on this interpretation Aristotle’s theory comes very close to hobbes’s view who fa-
mously claims that the polis is a product of art. one might say that it does not rule out that the 
polis as a certain artefact exists for good. There was no such period in the history of mankind 
in which political community did not exist. By contrast, hobbes seems to have accepted a 
pre-political phase in the history of mankind. This is not to say that there is no change in the 
history of different forms of political community, since deformations of practical reason may 
lead to bad political communities such as tyranny. on this, see Kullmann (1991. 99–101) who 
argues that Aristotle did not accept such a phase.
9  see roberts (2009. 557). she also emphasises that civic excellence is connected to par-
ticular political circumstances.
10  As it is clear in the discussion about practical insight in NE Vi (e.g., 1142a12–16) where 
Aristotle points to the significance of experience in acquiring it, which has been thoroughly 
discussed by hursthouse (2006) who emphasises the skill-like character of φρόνησις. see 
also Mulgan (1987. 10) and surprenant (2012. 223–225). Although it is certainly true that 
practical insight combines intellectual strength with experience in order to facilitate right 
decisions, one also has to pay attention to Politics 1277b28–29 where we are told that the 
ruler who has practical insight has knowledge as well, and the two properties are tied to one 
another. Thus the intellectual side of practical insight is contrasted to the cognitive state of 
ordinary citizens.
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of reforming the character of the soul (1340b10–13). The modification recalls 
Plato’s description of the educational process of the youth in the Republic. dif-
ferent kinds of music give rise to different dispositions of the soul. it also makes 
a big difference as to which instrument the young is supposed to play; flute and 
cithera are not advised, the former being all too frivolous anyway (οὐκ ήϑικὸν 
ἀλλά ὀργιαστικόν, 1341a21–22). The primary aim of musical education is not 
to produce professionals. rather, it aims at cultivating taste and establishing 
proper dispositions in the soul. despite the divergence from the thesis on ha-
bituation in Nicomachean Ethics i, Aristotle insists that civic excellence is not 
something to be taught by way of direct indoctrination, even if the way of its 
acquisition is somewhat different from what he suggests in the ethical work. it 
seems, therefore, that civic excellences do not differ in kind from those excel-
lences which Aristotle discusses in the ethics. hence their internal relations may 
not differ from those mentioned in the ethical treatises either. We might get a 
more complex picture, however, if we examine the context in which practical 
insight is introduced in the Politics.
it seems that excellence can be attributed, not only to individuals, but to 
cities as well. courage, justice, practical insight and, perhaps, temperance of 
the city have the same power and form as the one we find in each person hav-
ing those characteristics (1323b34 ff.).11 Without them the city cannot function 
properly. i suppose that the moral qualities of a city are derivative of those in 
the individual. derivation may take two forms: we say either, for example, that 
the city is courageous because the citizens are courageous, or courage is a kind of 
supervenient quality which comes from good arrangement and proper distribu-
tion of tasks. nothing seems to support the second option. it implies, however, 
that the analysis in the ethical works applies to communal life as well. This may 
be the reason why Aristotle does not examine them in detail in the Politics. nev-
ertheless, the common root allows for certain variations which are due to the ar-
gumentative context. it is a matter of practical insight to recognise the best laws 
and those which fit the polities (1289a12). it is not just a technical skill which 
can be used for various purposes, good or bad alike.12 here Aristotle maintains 
the difference he made in the Nicomachean Ethics between practical insight and 
cunningness (ἀγχινοία/δεινοτής) which is a neutral strength of thinking on 
practical matters.13 furthermore, it is linked to age which leads to a distribu-
tion of work in the city. Youth is naturally more vigorous and powerful, whereas 
11  in line b34 σωφροσύνη was added by the Greek humanist scholar Adamantios Korais.
12  in 1253a34 he says that men are born with weapons for excellence in character and prac-
tical insight but such weapons can be used for evil purposes lacking excellence in character. 
one might allow the possibility that excellence in character alone may cause such a situation. 
for an explanation, see schütrumpf (1) (1991), ad loc.
13  or, practical insight can be deformed into cleverness in tyranny (Pol. iii 7), as has been 
emphasised by Kamp (1985. 282).
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older people are more likely endowed with practical insight (1329a9–15). Ac-
cording to this division, the citizen body is divided into fighting and counselling 
part.14 rulers emerge from this social ambience of the city for they must pos-
sess practical insight. Thus the additional information we gain by reading the 
Politics may be twofold. first, as for its cognitive nature, practical insight must 
be knowledge, not just right opinion. The difference between the two cognitive 
states will be discussed later. furthermore, as a consequence, practical insight 
enables us to see which law is the best and which fits the polity – for laws must 
be adjusted to polity, not vice versa. second, it can contribute to the distribution 
of social roles as well, since its possession qualifies people to take part in the life 
of the city in a specific way.
now it seems that the function of practical insight is very much tied to the 
exercise of civic (πολιτική) expertise, and as a result, to the exercise of political 
power.15 ruling requires practical insight for excellent performance. The inti-
mate link between them has been described in Nicomachean Ethics Book 6. in a 
typically Aristotelian manner we are told (1141b23–24) that practical insight and 
civic expertise are the same state (ἕξις), although their being is different, which 
may mean that they are different manifestations of the same capacity.16 At this 
point, it has not been settled yet whether they are partly or entirely different 
from one another. in so far as the disposition concerns the city, the architectonic 
form of practical insight is legislative expertise with the task of discovering and 
establishing the best laws in the society in question (ne 1141b25), whereas at 
the level of individuals it has the common name ‘civic expertise’ and is con-
cerned with action and deliberation.17 later he adds that it also has a kind called 
judicial (δικαστική) expertise (1141b34) which must have something to do with 
practice in the courts.18 Architectonic and civic forms of practical insight must be 
connected for the following reason. The decree by which the city is managed, 
is something to be acted upon, as what comes last in the process which includes 
both deliberation and legislation. The decree is issued by way of a legislative 
procedure which involves practical insight. We can observe that Aristotle starts 
his argument from the observation of common conceptions. in everyday usage, 
14  1329a31: ὁπλητικόν… βουλευτικόν.
15  i think πολιτική must be supplemented with τέχνη (expertise), not with ἀρετή (excel-
lence), see Broadie-rowe (2002. 183, 373).
16  This is controversial, ebert thinks (1995. 169) that they are the same state, and their 
difference is nominal only. difference in being might involve difference in definition, see 
Broadie-rowe (2002. 373–4).
17  This is related to concrete political action which differs from legislation, as has been 
emphasized by Bien (1973/1985. 138).
18  in 1141b30–34 Aristotle enumerates the different kinds of practical insight conceived of 
as “caring about one’s own interest” (contrasted with the involvement in political matters), 
which are household management, legislative and civic expertise, the latter being divided 
into deliberative and legislative expertises. The classification interlocks with the division 
of architectonic form of practical insight in an interesting way, an issue i cannot discuss here.
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practical insight is the ability of the person to take care of himself as an individ-
ual (1141b30). By way of expansion, which Aristotle thinks advisable, it relates 
to household management as well. The relation between the two main forms of 
practical insight is not quite clear, but so much may be said that civic expertise 
is not an implementation of rules laid down by the architectonic form.19 We can-
not rule out that even if the architectonic form is superior, it is originated in the 
person’s care for himself.20 The comparison between judicial and deliberative 
oratory in the Rhetoric may also support the claim.21 There Aristotle says that 
speaking in the assembly is prior to legal debates because in political debates 
it is useless to speak outside the subject. for this reason deliberative oratory 
leaves less scope for manipulation than judicial speech. on his view, political 
argumentation is linked to public deliberation in the course of which each mem-
ber of the audience has to decide about something familiar to him. This is not 
the case in the courts where the jury decides about issues concerning other peo-
ple. Thus political debates may provide a better condition for rational persua-
sion since they concern issues that are important to each citizen as citizen. As a 
consequence, citizens consider the problems discussed as their own and they try 
to get as much and thorough information about it as possible.
We have seen that political expertise and practical insight arise from the same 
state of the soul, although practical insight has manifestations that do not belong 
to the sphere of polity. Among the political manifestations of practical insight 
the most important are the recognition of the best law and the one which fits 
best the ideal polity, and the involvement in the legislative process. it does not 
mean that some manifestations remain within the confines of private life. We 
have also seen that it is knowledge which can be contrasted with right opinion; 
rulers have knowledge. By contrast, the good citizen does not need practical 
insight, but only right opinion (1277b28–29).22 As he occupies a lower office, his 
decisions are of a limited range and weight, and can be overseen by the ruler 
having practical insight. Aristotle does not claim, and we do not have to assume, 
that φρόνησις amounts to an abstract, theoretical knowledge.23
19  see Broadie-rowe (2002. 373).
20  This is a well-known method of Aristotle, see his discussion of friendship in NE Book 9. 
famously, he derives friendship from self-love.
21  Rhetoric 1354b22–1355a1. i owe this point to Miklós Könczöl.
22  schütrumpf (2) (1991. 433–434) discusses the Platonic origin of the distinction but does 
not examine the question of the content of these cognitive states within the context of the 
Aristotelian distinction in An. Post. ii. i will not deny, of course, that Aristotle was aware of 
Plato’s distinctions. i shall only try to put it into an Aristotelian context. surprenant (2012. 
224) explains the passage by saying that “a citizen is able to display phronesis at the point 
when he becomes a ruler. if and when he ceases to be a ruler, his judgment, which was for-
merly considered to be phronesis, is no longer knowledge but opinion.” he thus seems to link 
the possession of practical insight to social status. it is not clear whether difference in status 
implies difference in content as well.
23  As has been emphasised convincingly by Bodéüs (1993. 34–37).
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There remains to examine the character of the difference between the two 
cognitive states. how to distinguish between knowledge and true opinion in 
this context? The thesis sounds almost like a Platonic distinction. it may be 
clear that, as an excellence of the thinking faculty of the soul, practical insight 
must not only be a fine exercise of thinking on practical matters, but also has to 
possess (or has to have access to) a specific content.24 in order to be knowledge, 
then, practical insight must have propositional content. We have to bear in mind 
also that practical insight is knowledge about particulars as well (1142a15). it 
implies that the content may not be made up of universal statements, or, to 
put it with more reservation, it may not be made up of universal statements 
exclusively. Thus the distinction between knowledge and true opinion is not 
to be equated with the distinction between universal and particular statements. 
What is the rationale for setting apart the two cognitive states?  My sugges-
tion is that the difference might not amount to the difference between a true 
statement of fact and a true statement of fact accompanied with a right causal 
explanation. it is a much discussed difference between a hoti- and a dia ti-type 
of propositions. Aristotle discusses it at length in Posterior Analytics.25 There, in 
Book ii, he compares opinion with knowledge. first, knowledge is universal 
and acquired by necessary premises. opinion is a consequence from premises 
that express contingency (88b30–89a2). if the difference mentioned in the Poli-
tics were of this kind, however, then we run into a serious difficulty. how can the 
rulers have necessary knowledge about matters concerning the polis? The rul-
ers’ knowledge must be practical knowledge which is about contingent things.26 
The crucial component of practical insight, deliberation, rests on the very pos-
sibility of things’ being otherwise. The second option for distinguishing opinion 
and knowledge is that right opinion is about the fact only (89a22–23). Aristotle 
claims that if someone thinks that the propositions are true but his thought does 
not follow from the nature of the subject-matter, he will have opinion and not 
knowledge.27 in this way, opinion is both of the fact and of the reason. opinion 
24  The distinction between possessing and having access to certain content may suggest 
that the exact status of the intellectual excellences might be vague. We may say either that 
practical insight is a sub-faculty on its own, and has its own content, or the thinking faculty 
works differently in different situations (which fit the threefold division of sciences) and has 
a unitary content of different kinds propositions. At this point i do not see clear evidence for 
any of the options.
25  see 78a22, 79a23, 88b30–89b6.
26  The primary example of someone having practical insight is Pericles (ne 1140b10) 
whose excellence was manifest, not in possessing universal knowledge, but in administering 
the affairs of the state. Aubenque (1963. 54–56) also draws attention to the fact that Aristotle 
chose a politician as an example, which may be due to his insistence on the supreme position 
of political knowledge as well.
27  if opinion rests on the immediate premises, on premises that are not derived by correct 
reasoning from necessary premises, it can be both about fact and about reason. for an analysis 
of the passage (89a3–18), see ross (1949/1965. 607).
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can be of fact only if it follows from immediate premises. Thus we have two pos-
sibilities to separate the cognitive state of the rulers from that of the subjects. 
first, unlike good rulers, then, good citizens know the fact but cannot provide 
causal explanation for that. on the other hand, subjects can opine on reasons 
but in doing so they do not exploit the nature of the subject-matter.28 The latter 
option may involve that they do not rely on the necessary, definitional proper-
ties of the subject-matter. Thus the knowledge of the rulers can be based on 
necessary premises but they do not express the necessity of events since events 
are not necessitated in the practical world. rather, the premises express the 
necessary presence of certain properties.29 it is important to realise that such a 
distinction is missing from the analysis of practical insight in the Nicomachean 
Ethics. The reason for the omission is not quite clear and i cannot pretend to 
have a persuasive answer at this point.30
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